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Abstract
This paper uses a unique daily time series data set to investigate the asymmetric
response of airline prices to capacity costs driven by demand fluctuations. We use a
Markov regime-switching model with time-varying transition probabilities to capture
the time variation in the response. The results show strong evidence of asymmetric
price adjustments: positive cost shifts have a large positive effect, while negative cost
shifts have no effect. The asymmetry is also explained by summer travel, but not by
the size of cost shifts. The findings show the importance of consumer heterogeneity
and capacity constraints as a source of asymmetric responses.
Keywords: Asymmetric pricing, Airlines, Regime switching, Capacity costs
JEL Classifications: C22, L93
∗This paper benefited from comments by Jihui Chen, Damian Damianov, Walter Enders, Matt Holt, Paan
Jindapon, Marie Mora, Timothy Richards, Harris Schlesinger, Danilo Trupkin and seminar participants at
The University of Alabama, The University of Texas - Pan American, and the International Industrial
Organization Conference in Boston. Stephanie C. Reynolds provided outstanding assistance with the data.
†Department of Economics & Finance, The University of Texas - Pan American, Edinburg,
TX 78539, Phone: (956) 665-3366, Fax: (956) 665-5020, Email: escobarida@utpa.edu, URL:
http://faculty.utpa.edu/escobarida
1
1 Introduction
There is a large empirical literature showing evidence that prices respond more quickly to
cost increases than to cost decreases. Peltzman (2000) shows that this phenomenon, also
known as asymmetric pricing or rockets and feathers, exists in a large number of markets.
Asymmetric pricing studies include, for example, Enders and Granger (1998) on the term
structure of interest rates, Goodwin and Holt (1999) in the U.S. beef industry, Toolsema
and Jacobs (2007) on mortgage rates, Mu¨ller and Ray (2007) on disaggregate product-level
scanner data, and Zachmann and von Hirschhausen (2008) on wholesale electricity prices.
The favorite place to study asymmetric pricing is retail gasoline markets, where retail and
wholesale prices are readily observable by researchers. Two highly cited studies in gasoline
markets are Borenstein et al. (1997), who find asymmetry from crude prices to retail prices
in the U.S., and Bachmeier and Griffin (2003) who find no evidence of asymmetry.1
The main goal in this paper is to extend the existing literature by testing for the exis-
tence of asymmetric pricing in airlines. In addition, we investigate whether the asymmetric
response can be characterized by specific sources of asymmetries. Despite the vast empirical
literature on airline pricing, no previous study has focused on the existence of asymmetric
pricing in airline markets. Most of the papers in airlines use data from the Bureau of Trans-
portation Statistics (e.g., Borenstein and Rose (1994), Hayes and Ross (1998), and Gerardi
and Shapiro (2009)), which are too aggregate to be used for asymmetric pricing. More ap-
propriate data would need to follow day-by-day pricing decisions, such as the posted prices
data used in Stavins (2001), McAfee and te Velde (2007), Bilotkach and Rupp (2011), or
in Gaggero and Piga (2011). In this paper we take advantage of a unique time series daily
data set, similar in construction to Alderighi et al. (2012), Escobari (2009) and Escobari
(2012), that has information not only on posted prices, but on inventories of seats. An ad-
ditional benefit from our data set is that it spans for 128 different departure dates keeping
the same flight-numbers (e.g., American Airlines flight 1419 from St. Louis (STL) to Las
Vegas (LAS)), which allows price and inventory comparisons over time.
While no research has specifically addressed asymmetries in airline price, there have
been related papers that can explain price adjustments by airlines. Busse (2002) examines
1For a survey of the literature see Meyer and von Cramon-Taubadel (2004).
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how an airline’s financial situation affects its decision to lower its price. Athey et al. (2004)
present a model in which firms receive a privately observed cost shock each period and
prices are strictly increasing in its cost level. Staiger and Wolak (1992) suggest that in
periods of low demand, firms that have excess capacity have incentives to cut prices. In
a context with uncertain demand and costly capacity, Prescott (1975) and Dana (1999)
predict higher prices as a response to higher demand realizations.
Unlike other industries where observed input prices drive output prices, in airlines the
main cost-based source of price dispersion within the same flight depends on the optimal
peak-load pricing strategy. Borenstein and Rose (1994, p.666) explain that this cost-based
price variation among passengers on the same flight or on the same flight-number over
different departure dates depends on the perceived probability that demand will exceed
capacity. Holding capacity fixed over flights with the same flight-number, we proxy for
this cost-based source using realized demand—seats already sold. The intuition is simple,
keeping the number of days to departure fixed, a larger realized demand means that there
are fewer available seats, which in turn translates into a larger shadow cost of capacity for
the next available seat that the airline needs to price. Notice that this is consistent with
dynamic pricing in airlines, where the sellers dynamically adjust prices as the departure
date nears. The key idea in dynamic pricing is that the airline will set higher prices if
realized demand is larger than expected, while lower prices will be set if demand is falling
short (see, e.g., Escobari (2012)). Then, the current inventory captures the cost-based price
variation on the same flight (as in dynamic pricing) and on the same flight-number over
different departure dates (as in the current paper).
To characterize the time variation in the response of prices to costs we use a first-order
Markov-switching process as in Hamilton (1989) for the fixed transition probabilities and
as in Filardo (1994) for the time-varying transition probabilities following the methodology
proposed in Lo and Piger (2005). After testing for the existence of any asymmetry in the
response, we examine whether the time variation of the response can be explained by specific
sources of asymmetries. In particular, the paper considers four sources of asymmetries: (i)
to test for asymmetric pricing we focus on the direction of the cost shift (positive vs.
negative), (ii) the size of the cost shift, (iii) asymmetry related to the specific departure
days (weekdays vs. holidays and weekends), and (iv) asymmetry related to the sales season
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(summer vs. fall). The time-varying transition probabilities characterizing the regime-shift
are modeled as a function of state variables that describe each of these four sources of
asymmetries. The benefit of this approach is that it does not force the time variation in
the coefficients to correspond to a particular asymmetry and that various manifestations
of asymmetries can be modeled jointly, which is helpful when sources of asymmetries are
correlated.
The results show strong support for an asymmetric response, with the time variation in
the response switching between periods of ‘high’ and period of ‘low’ response. Furthermore,
there is strong statistical evidence that two particular sources of asymmetries explain the
time variation between regimes. Positive demand shifts have a positive effect on prices,
while negative demand shifts have no effect. In addition, there is evidence that cost shifts
during the summer departure dates have a positive larger effect on prices than cost fluctu-
ations once the summer travel season is over. There is little evidence that the asymmetric
response is driven by the size of the cost shift or by travel during the weekends or holidays.
The organization of the paper is as follows. Section 2 explains the collection of the data,
while the empirical strategy is presented in Section 3. The estimation results are presented
in Section 4, followed by Section 5 that discusses various theoretical models to explain the
findings. Section 6 concludes.
2 Data
The data set was collected during 126 consecutive days (18 weeks) between Monday June
1 and Sunday October 4, 2009 from the online travel agency Expedia.com. The data
collection is initially similar to Stavins (2001), but with two important improvements. First,
following Escobari (2009) and Escobari (2012), it has information on seat inventories at
each price, obtained from the seat availability map where the available preferred or prime
seats are counted as available seats. Second, it spans over a large number of departure
dates to allow observing fluctuations in demand realizations (measured via inventories).
To control for the effect of days to departure, all fares and inventory levels were collected
at eight days prior to the corresponding departure date. Therefore, the actual departure
dates occur between Tuesday June 9 and Monday October 12, 2009.
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To make price and costs comparable over time we follow Borenstein and Rose (1994,
p.666), who explain the existence of cost-based price variation among passengers on the
same flight-number over different departure dates. Hence, the collection keeps track of
32 different flight-numbers (e.g., American Airlines flight 1419 from St. Louis (STL) to
Las Vegas (LAS)), where each flight-number is offered every day with the same aircraft
size.2 Each flight-number belongs to one of 18 different segments, where a segment is
defined as a pair of departing and destination airports. We follow the same strategy as
Escobari (2009) and Escobari (2012) to control for various sources of price dispersion in
the industry. Each recorded fare corresponds to the least expensive economy-class, one-way
ticket in a non-stop flight. By choosing the least expensive available fare, we control for the
existence of more expensive refundable tickets. Focusing on economy class tickets controls
for price differentials associated with different fare classes. Moreover, selecting one-way
flights is important to control for price differentials associated with round-trip tickets, such
as minimum- and maximum-stay, and Saturday-night-stayover restrictions. Choosing non-
stop flights controls for price variation related to more sophisticated itineraries that may
include open jaws, connecting flights and different combination of segments.
While focusing on one-way non-stop tickets help control for various sources of price
dispersion and help to define a single inventory at each price, the inventory of seats is
also sold as part of round-trips and longer itineraries. Even if one-way tickets are a small
fraction of overall tickets sold, this should not affect the pricing equation that we will
estimate as long as the carrier adjusts the observed one-way price based on the current
inventory. Moreover, focusing on one-way non-stop tickets may seem restrictive when trying
to generalize the results, for example, to round-trip tickets. However, this is not different
than the standard assumption in papers that use data from the Bureau of Transportation
Statistics, where the round-trip price is calculated as two times the one-way price.3
[Insert Figure 1 here.]
2The detail of the flights in the sample appears in the Appendix. While it would be interesting to see
how between-flight heterogeneity plays a role, in this paper we follow most of the literature on asymmetric
pricing (e.g., Borenstein et al. (1997), Enders and Granger (1998), Bachmeier and Griffin (2003), Mu¨ller
and Ray (2007), and Toolsema and Jacobs (2007)) and focus on the time-series dimension.
3See, for example, Borenstein and Rose (1994, p. 677), and Gerardi and Shapiro (2009, p. 5).
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Our measure of costs is captured by relative inventory levels, defined as the ratio of the
number of seats sold to total number of seats in the aircraft. Hence, it will be zero if the
plane is empty and one if it is full. Figure 1 shows the average relative inventory levels
(across the 32 flights in the sample) for different departure dates. The shading represents
the flights scheduled to depart during weekends or during a holiday.4 There are two main
things worth noting in this figure. First, demand at eight days to departure appears to
have a pattern that repeats itself every week, with higher costs during the weekends and
lower on Tuesdays. Second, it appears that costs are lower once the summer is over, where
the difference in costs between weekends and weekdays becomes greater. One of the goals
in this paper is to specifically test whether this apparently different demand (cost) behavior
acts as source of asymmetry in the response of prices to costs.
3 Empirical Strategy
The empirical strategy to investigate how prices respond to costs is similar to Lo and Piger
(2005).5 The first step is to decompose the price, Pricet, into two unobserved additive
components: a permanent component, PricePt , and a transitory component, Price
T
t .
That is:
Pricet = Price
P
t +Price
T
t . (1)
The permanent component is specified with the following random walk:
PricePt = µ+Price
P
t−1 + νt, (2)
where we assume that the innovation νt is a normally distributed i.i.d. random variable.
The forecast function of Equation 2 is linear with constant slope µ and the level changes
with the realizations of νt.
6 We expect this formulation of the permanent component to
capture structural breaks in the pricing behavior.
4The official holiday dates during the sample period are Friday July 3 (Independence Day, observed),
Monday September 7 (Labor Day), and Monday October 12 (Columbus Day).
5Lo and Piger (2005) analyze the response of output to monetary policy.
6A different formulation that modeled the drift µ as a simple random walk, allowing the level as well
as the slope of the forecast function to change over time showed no low frequency shocks to the trend
component. Hence, we follow the current and simpler formulation of a constant µ.
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On the other hand, the transitory component PriceTt is modeled as the following
autoregressive process:
φ(L) ·PriceTt = γ0(L) ·Costt + γ1(L) ·Costt · St + εt, (3)
φ(L) =
K∑
k=0
φk · Lk; φ0 = 1; γi(L) =
J∑
j=0
γj,i · Lj , (4)
where Costt is proxied by the realized demand. The idea behind this proxy is that the
main cost-based source of price dispersion within the same flight depends on the optimal
peak-load pricing strategy. Borenstein and Rose (1994, p.666) explain that this cost-based
price variation among passengers on the same flight or on the same flight-number over
different departure dates depends on the perceived probability that demand will exceed
capacity. Holding capacity and the number of days prior to departure fixed (as we do in
the sample), a higher realized demand means a larger shadow cost of capacity because there
are fewer empty seats that the airline can sell. A seat sold today means a forgone sale to
a potential passenger that may arrive closer to departure.
St in Equations 3 and 4 is an indicator variable that takes the values 0 and 1 to capture
the regime switches in the response of PriceTt to Costt. This formulation is consistent
with the theoretical model of price posting in Deneckere and Peck (2012), where the price
responds to realized demand. This means that Costt can be treated as predetermined.
φ(L) is a polynomial in the lag operator with all its roots lying outside the unit circle
and the innovation εt is a normally distributed i.i.d. random variable. This specification
captures how cost fluctuations only affect the transitory component of prices and has no
long-run effects on prices.
The response of the transitory component of prices to realized demand is allowed to
change over time between two regimes. The regimes will be indexed by the indicator vari-
able St, which is unobserved by the econometrician and has to be filtered from the data.
To make the problem tractable, the estimation procedure assumes that the transition be-
tween different response regimes is governed by a first-order Markov process as in Hamilton
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(1989):
P (St = 0|St−1 = 0) = exp(c0)
(1 + exp(c0))
(5)
P (St = 1|St−1 = 0) = 1− P (St = 0|St−1 = 0)
P (St = 1|St−1 = 1) = exp(c1)
(1 + exp(c1))
P (St = 0|St−1 = 1) = 1− P (St = 1|St−1 = 1)
Equations 5 consider the simple case of time invariant, or fixed transition probabilities
(FTP). With FTP we will be able to capture the timing of the shifts in the response of
the transitory component of prices to realized demand. However, to make the problem
more interesting we will modify Equations 5 to have a time-varying transition probability
(TVTP) specification as in Filardo (1994) to allow for the regime-switching process to
change over time and be a function of a q×1 vector of state variables zt = (z1t, z2t, ..., zqt)′:
P (St = 0|St−1 = 0) = exp(c0 + z
′
t · a0)
(1 + exp(c0 + z′t · a0))
(6)
P (St = 1|St−1 = 1) = exp(c1 + z
′
t · a1)
(1 + exp(c1 + z′t · a1))
We will choose the vector of state variables zt to address four different asymmetries. In
particular, zt will include different sets of dummy variables to capture asymmetries with
respect to the sign of the cost shift, the size of the cost shift, the effect of weekends and
holidays, and the effect of summer travel. In addition, the testing procedure allows us to
identify the effect of combinations of asymmetries (e.g., summer travel and the sign of cost
shifts during the summer). a0 and a1 in Equation 6 are the q × 1 vectors of coefficients
(a01, a02, ..., a0q)
′ and (a11, a12, ..., a1q)′ associated with zt at each state. J lags of each of
the dummy variables will be included in zt to be able characterize the existing conditions
at the time carriers set fares.
The state dummy variable that captures the asymmetry related to the direction of the
cost shift will be Signt. It takes the value of zero if the cost shift at time t is negative and
will equal to one if the cost shift is positive. For the size of the cost shift, the state dummy
variable Sizet takes the value of zero if the cost shift at time t is within one standard
deviation of its mean, one otherwise. Wkndt is the state dummy variable equal to one if
the departure date occurs during the weekend (i.e., Saturday and Sunday, not including
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Friday) or during a holiday, zero otherwise. Finally, Summt is the state dummy variable
that characterizes summer departure dates, being equal to one if the departure date is
during the summer departure dates, zero otherwise.
4 Results
To estimate the model described in the previous section, we will use the logarithm of the
average one-way nonstop fare across the 32 flight-numbers for the Pricet variable. In
addition, for Costt, following Lo and Piger (2005), we will use the deviations from the
difference in the logarithm of the average realized demand across the 32 flight-numbers.
To be able to use maximum likelihood, we apply the filtering and smoothing algorithm
presented in Kim (1994) to obtain its Markov-switching state-space representation. An
unconditional expectation of the transition equation to initiate the Kalman filter portion
of the filter is not available because of the non-stationarity of the transition equation for the
state-space representation of the model. Therefore the filter was initiated with guesses on
which we place high variance and then to allow the effects of the initial guesses to dissipate,
the likelihood function was computed only after two weeks of data. Hence, even though the
data starts earlier, the output will span from Monday June 27 through Saturday October
12, 2009.
4.1 Significance of the Regime-Switch
We now turn to test whether the regime-switching model represents a significant progress
in terms of the model fit relative to the constant response coefficients. To do this we use
the testing procedure developed in Hansen (1992). The significance of the FTP model is
tested against the null hypothesis of constant response coefficients, that is γj,0 = γj,1 for all
j.7 Using the test in Hansen (1992) is important because in this type of Markov-switching
models, some of the nuisance parameters are not identified under the null hypothesis.
Hence, the violation of this regularity condition means that the standard likelihood ratio
7To specify the lag orders K and J we started estimating the fixed transition probabilities model with
K = 7 and J = 7 and then reduced the lag order until a likelihood ratio test finds a significant value for
either φk or γj,i. This procedure resulted in a lag order of K = 2 and J = 1, which will be the ones we
employ in the rest of the paper.
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test for the null hypothesis has an unknown distribution. The procedure yields an upper
bound of the p-value for the null hypothesis, thus it is viewed as a conservative test of the
null. The results provided a likelihood ratio statistic of 2.484 with an associated upper
bound for the p-value of 0.01. This is interpreted as strong evidence favoring the regime-
switching response coefficients.
4.2 Asymmetries in the Response
After finding that the response of prices to costs is characterized by a regime-switching
model, we now move to search for specific type of asymmetries and consider the TVTP
with transition probabilities characterized by Equations 6. Within the TVTP specification,
P (St = 1|St−1 = 1) will be modeled as a time invariant parameter because the estimation
results showed that St = 1 during very short periods of time. Hence, there is little role for
zt to play in explaining variation within P (St = 1|St−1 = 1) and the discussion will focus
on the time variation in the transition probability P (St = 0|St−1 = 0).
[Insert Table 1 here.]
The first specification for zt does not include any dummy variables and corresponds
to the FTP model where Equations 6 reduce to Equations 5. The first three columns of
Table 1 contain the Schwarz Information Criterion (SIC), the Akaike Information Criterion
(AIC) and the maximized value of the log of the likelihood function. The four TVTP
specifications for zt represent the four characterizations of the asymmetries explained above,
that is, Signt, Sizet, Wkndt, and Summt. To see whether positive cost shifts affect
prices differently than negative cost shifts, the second characterization of zt presented
in Table 1 includes the dummy variables capturing the direction of the cost shift, zt =
(Signt,Signt−1)′. The likelihood ratio test suggests that it can explain the asymmetric
response in prices. When considering whether the size, weekend travel, or summer travel
drive the regime switch, the AIC prefers the zt = (Summt,Summt−1)′ model. Moreover,
the likelihood ratio test also supports Summt as a source of the asymmetric response.
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4.3 Estimation Results
The model specification selection described above suggests that the response of the tran-
sitory component of price to cost shifts varies between two regimes and the regime shifts
can be explained by specific sources of asymmetries. The probability of a regime switch
was found to depend, to minor extent on (1) whether the cost shift is positive or negative
and, with slightly more evidence on (2) whether the cost shift occurs during summer travel
or during the fall. For comparison purposes, the first column in Table 2 presents the max-
imum likelihood estimates of the simple FTP model. The results for the TVTP models
for different specifications of zt are presented in columns 2 through 5. While none of the
TVTP specifications find a statistically significant σν , the positive and significant estimate
of σν in the FTP specification suggests the existence of a permanent shock to prices.
[Insert Table 2 here.]
The transitory component of price for the Sign specification is presented in Figure 2,
where the shaded areas correspond to the dates characterized by positive cost shifts, Signt
= 1. This figure shows some relationship between increases in PriceTt and episodes of
positive cost shifts. The sharp increase in demand on Friday, October 9 may be explained
by Columbus Day holiday, celebrated the following Monday 12. Moreover, there is evidence
of a positively skewed PriceTt , as the positive deviations from the permanent component
PricePt appear larger than the negative deviations.
[Insert Figure 2 here.]
To simulate the path of PriceTt+j as captured by Equation 3 and the estimates of the
regime-switching response coefficients, γ0,0, γ1,0, γ0,1, and γ1,1, Figures 3 and 4 provide
the state-dependent impulse response functions for the Sign and Summ specifications,
respectively. The results reported in the second (Sign) and fifth (Summ) columns of
Table 2 show that the indicator variable St divides the cost shifts in two: the ones that have
a relatively large and the ones that have relatively small effect on the transitory component
of prices. The cost shift Costt is set to be equal to 0.055, which is its historical standard
deviation and corresponds to a 5.5% change in capacity utilization—ratio of occupied seat
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to total seats. The responses are obtained under four possible realizations of the indicator
variables: St = St+1 = 0; St = 0 and St+1 = 1; St = 1 and St+1 = 0; and St = St+1 = 1,
where the responses only depend on St and St+1 because J = 0, 1. As is standard in the
computation of impulse response function, we make the following additional assumptions:
PriceTt−1 = PriceTt−2 = 0, εt+j = 0, ∀j and Costt−j = 0, j 6= 0. We can observe the
positive effect of cost shifts on the transitory component of prices from the Size specification
presented in Figure 3. The contemporaneous effect is captured by γ0,0 + γ0,1 times the size
of the shift. We can see that the effect of a cost shift is larger when either St = 1 or
St+1 = 1. A one standard deviation increase in costs increases contemporaneous prices by
12.2% during high response regime, that is when St = St+1 = 1, or St = 1 and St+1 = 0. A
one standard deviation increase in costs increases prices by 7.8% the next period if St = 0
and St+1 = 1. However, when St = St+1 = 0, there is only a small contemporaneous
increase of 0.8%. Because of the low estimated values of both, φ1 and φ2, the responses to
a cost shock die down fast. Figure 4 shows very similar results for the Summ specification.
[Insert Figure 3 here.]
[Insert Figure 4 here.]
To determine the estimates of P (St = 0|St−1 = 0) and P (St = 1|St−1 = 1) in the
FTP model, we focus our attention on the estimated coefficients cˆ0 and cˆ1. The first
one, cˆ0 = 2.296, is highly significant and yields an estimate of P (St = 0|St−1 = 0) =
exp(cˆ0)/(1 + exp(cˆ0)) = 0.909. Therefore, if St−1 = 0 meaning that we are in the low
response regime, the probability of staying in this regime is fairly high. On the other
hand, if we are in a high response regime, St−1 = 1, the probability that we stay in the
high response regime is P (St = 1|St−1 = 1) = exp(cˆ1)/(1 + exp(cˆ1)) = 0.511 or more
appropriately 0.5, as the estimated value for cˆ1 = 0.043 is not statistically significant.
To determine the estimates of the transition probabilities in the Sign specification, we
look at the estimated coefficients cˆ0, cˆ1, aˆ01 and aˆ02. Let’s initially consider the case in which
Signt−1 = Signt = 0. Then, with cˆ0 = 21.371, P (St = 0|St−1 = 0) = exp(cˆ0)/(1+exp(cˆ0))
= 1. This means that if St−1 = 0 and there has not been a positive demand shift recently,
we will stay in the low response regime with certainty. On the other hand, if Signt−1 =
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Signt = 1 meaning that there has been a positive demand shift recently, the estimates of
aˆ01 and aˆ02 indicate that P (St = 0|St−1 = 0) = exp(cˆ0 + aˆ01 + aˆ02)/(1+exp(cˆ0 + aˆ01 + aˆ02))
= 0.726. Hence, the probability of shifting from a low response regime, St−1 = 0, to a
high response regime, St = 1 goes from zero when there has not been a positive cost shift
recently to P (St = 1|St−1 = 0) = 1− 0.726 = 0.274 if there has been. This result indicates
that positive cost shifts are more likely to have a larger effect on prices than negative cost
shifts. Finally, the statistically non-significant cˆ1 = −0.3268 implies that once we are in a
high response regime, the probability of staying in that regime is P (St = 1|St−1 = 1) =
0.5.
The transition probabilities for the Summ specification are easier to interpret as we are
either in the summer, Summt−1 = Summt = 1 or in the fall, Summt−1 = Summt = 0. During
the fall, and based on the estimated cˆ0 = 3.46 that yields a P (St = 0|St−1 = 0) = 0.969, if
St = 0, we will stay in the low response regime with almost certainty. During the summer,
and based on the estimated cˆ1, aˆ01 and aˆ02 that correspond to a P (St = 0|St−1 = 0)
= 0.656, if St = 0, we are less likely to stay in the low response regime. Consequently,
the probability to change from a low response regime to a high response regime during
the summer is 0.344 versus 0.03 during the fall. Finally, and as in the previous case, the
probability of staying in a high response regime is 0.5, regardless on the season.
[Insert Figure 5 here.]
[Insert Figure 6 here.]
Figures 5 and 6 visually summarize the preceding discussion by presenting the filtered
probability that St = 1, P (St = 1|t), for the Sign and the Summ specifications respectively.
These ones are constructed using the TVTP model of Equations 1 through 6. In Figure 5
the shaded areas correspond to the periods in which the demand shift is positive, while the
shaded area in Figure 6 illustrates the summer departure dates. The figures distinguish
between the two regimes, when P (St = 1|t) is close to zero and during very short periods
of time, when it is close to one. Based on the filtered probability for both specifications,
we can argue that most of the time cost shifts have a small effect on prices and only
during short periods the effect is large. In addition, it is easy to see how a large number
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of the shaded areas match with periods in which the probability gets closer to one. While
this is not necessarily clear for Sign, in the preferred specification Summ it is easier to
distinguish the positive probabilities during the summer with almost no activity in the
transition probabilities during the fall.
4.4 Additional Results: Combined Asymmetries
The previous section found that two specifications of the TVTP were statistically signif-
icant, with Summ being the preferred specification. We now further explore the possi-
bility that combined asymmetries explain the shifts in the response. The first part of
Table 3 investigates the robustness of the Summ specification by adding to the vector of
state variables, one at the time, Sign, Size, and Wknd. The idea is to test if the ad-
ditional variable is significant once the effect of Summ is accounted for. The second part
of Table 3 investigates whether Sign, Size, or Wknd can explain variation in the regime
shift within the summer departure dates, where we have three additional specifications
for the state variables zt = (Summt, Summt−1, Summt×Signt, Summt−1×Signt−1)′, zt
= (Summt, Summt−1, Summt×Sizet, Summt−1×Sizet−1)′, and zt = (Summt, Summt−1,
Summt×Wkndt, Summt−1×Wkndt−1)′. This in not an unconditional significance of these
asymmetries, but rather we investigate for any significance of the asymmetries conditional
on being in the summer.
[Insert Table 3 here.]
The results indicate that within these six additional models, the SIC and the AIC select
the fourth. For this fourth model and at significance levels of 4.58% or higher, the likelihood
ratio test rejects the null hypothesis of the model including only Summ. Moreover, at a
significance level of 1.41% or higher, we reject the null of the FTP model. When we allow
the combination of asymmetries, we conclude that the preferred specification is the one
where the regime shift in the response is characterized by the difference between summer
and fall travel and distinguishes between positive and negative cost shifts within the summer
travel departure dates.
[Insert Figure 7 here.]
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The results from the preferred specification are summarized in two figures. Figure 7
shows the regime-dependent impulse response functions computed under the same settings
as before. When St = 1, a one standard deviation increase in Costt increases contempora-
neous prices by 10.0% regardless of the state of the response regime in the following period,
t+ 1. During a contemporaneous low response regime, St = 0, and a high response regime
next period, St+1 = 1, the cost shift has a small contemporaneous effect (0.9%), but a large
effect next period (8.8%). Cost shifts at t have almost no effect on prices during t + 1, if
t+ 1 belongs to a low response regime, St+1 = 0, being the responses -0.9% and -0.7% for
St = 0 and St = 1, respectively. In sum, when either St = 1 or St+1 = 1, the response of
the transitory component of prices to cost shifts is much larger. Cost shifts at t have no
effect on the prices on t+ 2 and beyond.
[Insert Figure 8 here.]
Figure 8 illustrates the filtered probabilities P (St = 1|t) to analyze the timing of the
regime switches. The shaded areas correspond to positive cost shifts during the summer,
Signt×Summt = 1. This figure shows that P (St = 1|t) is very close to one, mostly
during the positive cost shifts in the summer. In addition, it is very close to zero almost
throughout the fall departure dates, indicating that during this period prices respond very
little to (positive or negative) demand shifts.
5 Explaining the Asymmetry
The easiest way to explain why prices respond asymmetrically to cost shift is to understand
why inventories or realized demand serve as a proxy for costs. Airlines set capacity in
advance and need to price perishable seats under a highly uncertain demand. Hence, higher
demand realizations imply less available capacity, which translates into a higher opportunity
cost of a sale. A higher (lower) demand realization can be interpreted as a higher (lower)
opportunity cost of a seat. Therefore, several of the explanations of asymmetric pricing in
other industries can also be valid for airlines. For example, Peltzman (2000) provides as
one possible explanation the input price volatility, which would be consistent with a large
volatility in demand realizations. Also in the asymmetric pricing literature, Noel (2008)
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explains that capacity constraints diminish the incentives to undercut prices if a firm can
no longer serve the market at the new lower price.8
A second strain of literature that can motivate the existence of asymmetric price re-
sponses to capacity costs follows models that explain price dispersion as the result of price
commitments, costly capacity and demand uncertainty (e.g., Prescott (1975) and Dana
(1999)). In these models prices are inversely related to the probability of making a sale.
Hence, when the probability of higher demand states is relatively low, moving to a higher
demand state will trigger a relatively large response in prices as compared to the response
in prices in lower demand states.
A third strain may come from macroeconomic models. In a generalization of Ball and
Mankiw (1994), where under menu costs and an upper trend in prices—similar to higher
prices in airlines closer to departure—positive shocks trigger a greater price adjustment
than do negative shocks of the same size. With prices constantly going up as the departure
date approaches, carriers may choose to wait until the upward trend in prices does much of
the work instead of lowering prices and pay the menu cost. By contrast, a higher realization
of demand induces a huge desire to increase prices. As a result, positive shocks are more
likely to result in a price adjustment and positive adjustments are more likely to be larger
than negative adjustments.
Finally, asymmetric price responses can also be explained by the existence of heteroge-
neous consumers. Notice that the asymmetry illustrated in Figure 6 can be easily explicated
by differences in consumers between summer and fall travel. Moreover, consumer hetero-
geneity can as well explain why mid-week flights appear emptier. This is important in
light of recent literature on asymmetric pricing that considers consumers’ heterogeneities.
Yang and Ye (2008) consider consumers with heterogeneous beliefs about costs realizations,
then the existence of searchers and non-searchers drive the asymmetric price adjustment.
Moreover, in the theoretical model of Cabral and Fishman (2012), consumes’ willingness to
search is low when they observe small price variations, while in Tappata (2009) consumers
8Some explanations given in the asymmetric pricing literature appear unlikely to work for airlines. For
example, search costs in retail gasoline prices as in Lewis (2011) and as cited in Davis (2007). This is
because unlike other industries, in airlines consumers can costlessly compare fares across different flights
using the Internet.
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have heterogeneous search costs. In both of these last two models consumer’s heterogeneity
is key to produce asymmetric price adjustments.
6 Conclusion
This article uses a novel airlines daily time series data set with information on prices
and realized demand intensities to test for the existence of asymmetric pricing. We find
strong evidence that the coefficients measuring the response shift between a regime of no
statistically significant response and a regime of positive response. When the timing of the
response is allowed to change with specific sources of asymmetries, the results show strong
support that the sign of the cost shifts along with the selling season can explain the regime
shifts. Positive cost shifts are more likely to have a positive effect on prices than negative
cost shifts. Moreover, shifts during the summer travel season were found to have a larger
effect on prices. The size of the cost shift or the ex-ante known periods of high demand of
holidays and weekends did not appear to explain the shifts in the response.
The results in this paper show the importance of consumers’ heterogeneity, inventories,
capacity constraints and the perishability of airline seats to explain asymmetric pricing.
Under asymmetric pricing, higher demand states are absorbed by prices to avoid the seller to
sell out too soon. Moreover, lower demand states are absorbed by lower capacity utilizations
rates rather than by lower prices.
A Appendix
[Insert Table 4 here.]
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Table 1: Model Selection
Elements of zt SIC AIC Log likelihood LR testa
FTP
None -2.5543 -2.8374 155.7086
TVTP
Sign -2.5205 -2.8551 158.6084 0.0550
Size -2.4816 -2.8161 156.6226 0.4009
Wknd -2.4947 -2.8293 157.2945 0.2048
Summ -2.5256 -2.8601 158.8659 0.0425
Note: a p-value for a test of the null of the FTP.
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Figure 1: Realized demand (Cost). Shaded areas: Wkndt = 1. Year: 2009.
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Table 2: Parameter Estimates
FTP TVTP
Elements of zt: None Sign Size Wknd Summ
Parameter (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
σν 0.0039 0.0061 0.0046 0.0008 0.0051
(0.0005) (0.0037) (0.0064) (0.0038) (0.0049)
σ 0.0472 0.0462 0.0460 0.0478 0.0455
(0.0041) (0.0038) (0.0039) (0.0039) (0.0037)
φ1 0.1995 0.1235 0.1911 0.2190 0.1856
(0.1173) (0.0935) (0.1228) (0.0137) (0.0858)
φ2 -0.0100 -0.0038 -0.0091 -0.0120 -0.0086
(0.0117) (0.0058) (0.0117) (0.0598) (0.0080)
γ0,0 0.0995 0.1518 0.0908 0.0861 0.0862
(0.1150) (0.0966) (0.1073) (0.0882) (0.0971)
γ1,0 -0.1122 -0.1390 -0.1288 -0.1098 -0.1404
(0.0954) (0.0879) (0.0948) (0.0929) (0.0913)
γ0,1 2.4106 2.0317 2.3063 2.5431 2.2110
(0.5238) (0.5869) (0.6688) (0.4653) (0.5563)
γ1,1 0.8779 1.5148 0.9326 0.7594 0.8841
(0.4517) (0.6347) (0.4614) (0.4390) (0.3893)
c0 2.2963 21.3711 1.3803 1.7558 3.4565
(0.5620) (—a) (0.8459) (0.5647) (1.0222)
c1 0.0434 -0.3268 -0.0754 0.1339 0.8511
(0.4481) (0.9417) (1.9404) (0.9612) (0.7516)
a01 -9.6909 1.0691 4.6457 -8.0797
(0.5538) (1.2950) (1.6140) (1.2852)
a02 -10.7071 1.0616 19.8223 5.2679
(—a) (1.2449) (—a) (—a)
Log likelihood 155.7086 158.6084 156.6226 157.2945 158.8659
Notes: a The ML estimate appears on the boundary, violating regularity
conditions. Hence, to calculate the standard errors this coefficient was held
constant.
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Table 3: Model Selection: Combined Asymmetries
Elements of zt SIC AIC Log likelihood LR testa LR testb
TVTP
Summ, Sign -2.4805 -2.8665 161.1919 0.0269 0.0977
Summ, Size -2.4356 -2.8216 158.9030 0.1719 0.9636
Summ, Wknd -2.4678 -2.8538 160.5428 0.0464 0.1870
Summ, Summ×Sign -2.4953 -2.8814 161.9495 0.0141 0.0458
Summ, Summ×Size -2.4629 -2.8489 160.2956 0.0569 0.2394
Summ, Summ×Wknd -2.4648 -2.8509 160.3938 0.0525 0.2170
Note: a p-value for a test of the null of the FTP model. b p-value for a test of the
null of the Summ model.
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Figure 2: Estimated Transitory Component, PriceTt . TVTP: Sign. Shaded areas: Signt
= 1. Year: 2009.
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Figure 3: Impulse response function of PriceTt . TVTP: Sign.
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Figure 4: Impulse response function of PriceTt . TVTP: Summ.
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Figure 5: Filtered probability, P (St = 1|t). TVTP: Sign. Shaded areas: Signt = 1. Year:
2009.
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Figure 6: Filtered probability, P (St = 1|t). TVTP: Summ. Shaded areas: Summt = 1.
Year: 2009.
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Figure 8: Filtered probability, P (St = 1|t). TVTP: Summ, Sign×Summ. Shaded areas:
Signt×Summt = 1. Year: 2009.
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